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Abstract.
We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a
subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter
to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task, and to estimate that
parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard
lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to
select one lottery or the other, and then a series of betting choices in which the
subject is presented with a range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some
event that the subject has a belief over. Knowledge of the risk attitudes of subjects
conditions the inferences about subjective beliefs. Maximum simulated likelihood
methods are used to estimate a structural model in which subjects employ subjective
beliefs to make bets. We present evidence that some subjective probabilities are
indeed best characterized as probability distributions with non-zero variance.
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Subjective probabilities are widely viewed as being less certain than objective probabilities.
This view underlies theories of choice where the lack of precision in subjective probabilities affects
preferences directly, due to so-called ambiguity aversion or uncertainty aversion. In part it derives
from the intuition that subjectively perceived chances of an event occurring might suffer from some
lack of precision, and that this should matter for behavior.
In traditional expected utility models of choice behavior the uncertainty about the subjective
probability distribution does not affect the observed choice behavior for an individual as long as the
mean is unaffected. In other words, if one person has a mean-preserving change in their subjective
beliefs, they would have no reason to change their observed choices when betting on the eventual
outcome.
To account for preferences over ambiguity, and to obtain potentially refutable hypotheses
about how the degree of uncertainty in beliefs affects behavior, one therefore has to relax the
traditional model. Virtually all of the extensions of the expected utility model to date involve
allowing for the subjective probability of an event to be characterized as being uncertain, as if it were
one draw from a subjective probability distribution. Hence one talks about subjective beliefs, rather
than a single subjective probability. The subjective beliefs are therefore conceived of as a nondegenerate probability distribution, and not just a scalar. One can then consider a range of nontraditional models that admit of refutable changes in observable behavior (e.g., Segal [1987], Gilboa
and Schmeidler [1989], Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005] and Nau [2006]).1
We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability
distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a set of distributional parameters to be estimated from
observed choices in a well-defined experimental task, and to estimate those parameters as random coefficients. The
experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices defined over objective probabilities,
and then a series of betting choices in which the subject is presented with a range of bookies
1
The design of experiments and econometric methods to test these alternatives is a delicate matter, but
considerable progress has been made (e.g., Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv [2009], Halevy [2007] and Hey, Lotito and
Maffioleti [2007][2008]).
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offering odds on some outcome that the subject has a belief over. The event we focus on is a draw
from a humble bingo cage, populated with 60 balls that are orange and white. The subject knows
that there are 60, and that there are only orange and white balls. But the cage is only visible for about
10 seconds, and is rotating all the time to make it (practically) impossible for the subject to count the
number of orange balls. Thus it is unlikely that the subjective belief will match the objective
probability, or be an exact subjective probability.
The “random coefficients” approach is commonly used in econometrics to capture
unobserved individual heterogeneity, but that is just one interpretation of the estimates. To
understand the basic idea, assume that we were to estimate risk attitudes in a population, using a
sample of choices over standard lotteries (a common inferential task in experimental research). One
way to characterize individual heterogeneity in risk attitudes would be to assume that the risk
aversion coefficient was a linear function of observables. This is one way to model the observed
individual heterogeneity in behavior. Alternatively, and the approach adopted here, one might
assume that the coefficient was normally distributed across the sample.2 This is a way of modeling
the unobserved individual heterogeneity in behavior. In effect, in the traditional interpretation that
views all variance as being caused by observed or unobserved exogenous variables, each subject
would be assumed to have some true and precise coefficient value, but these values are viewed as
being distributed across the sample in a way that can be characterized by a normal distribution. One
then estimates hyper-parameters to reflect this population distribution.3
For example, if one assumes a normal distribution, the hyper-parameters to be estimated
would be a mean (population) risk aversion coefficient and a standard deviation in the (population)
risk aversion coefficient. Each hyper-parameter would be estimated by a point estimate and a standard

2

There is no necessary tension between the two approaches to characterize heterogeneity, although in practice
one tends to see data evaluated using one or the other method. We employ them in a complementary manner, as
illustrated later.
3
The terminology across the econometric literature is not standard, so the expression “hyper-parameter” can
have other meanings. Here it refers to the parameters that characterize the estimated distribution of the behavioral
parameter of interest.
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error.4 As the sample size gets larger, one would expect the estimated standard errors of the hyperparameters to shrink, for the usual reasons, but one would not necessarily expect the standard deviation
of the population parameter to shrink. This approach generalizes naturally to non-normal
distributions for the population parameter, and to multi-variate distributions where there are several
population parameters.
Our approach then is to estimate subjective beliefs as a normal distribution in the
population. There are two, equivalent ways that one could interpret these estimates, which we
discuss below. For the moment, to focus on essentials, assume that we have a representative
decision maker in the population with beliefs about the event that are normally distributed.
In section 1 we review the “mixed logit” specification of random utility models, in which the
latent index is assumed to be a linear function of observable characteristics of the choice and/or
individual. One or more of the parameters is then estimated as a random coefficient, by estimating a
set of hyper-parameters that characterize the distribution of the coefficient in the population. Our
exposition is brief, reflecting the availability of excellent treatments by Train [2003] and others, and
sets the stage for an extension to allow for the latent index to be a non-linear function of
characteristics. This extension is needed since virtually all interesting functional forms for utility and
subjective probabilities involve non-linear functions, but virtually all applications of random utility
models assume a linear or linearized approximation of the true utility function.5
In section 2 we consider our experimental design and the raw data. The lottery choice task is
a replication of the classic study of individual choice under risk due to Hey and Orme [1994]. The
betting task we implement is one of the experimental procedures for eliciting subjective beliefs
proposed by Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2010], but building on an old and
venerable literature such as de Finetti [1937][1970], Savage [1971] and Epstein [1977; p. 298ff.].
4

To be pedantic, there are then four estimates: the point estimate and standard error of the mean of the
population parameter, and the point estimate and standard error of the standard deviation of the population parameter.
5
This extension to non-linear mixed logit, while formally modest, is also likely to be of considerable value
more generally, since it allows direct estimation of latent structural parameters of virtually any specification. Andersen,
Harrison, Hole and Rutström [2010] document general software, developed within Stata, to estimate non-linear mixed
logit models.
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What is important here is that the second task be one that associates beliefs about some event with
observable consequences, such as bets with monetary consequences based on the outcome of an
event.
In section 3 we generate estimates of the subjective beliefs of our subjects, initially using
methods that assume that there is no subjective uncertainty and then methods that allow for some
subjective uncertainty. We find evidence that there is some subjective uncertainty in the population.

1. Linear and Non-Linear Mixed Logit
To fix ideas, assume that we initially want to estimate a parameter to reflect risk attitudes in a
conventional lottery choice task. Then we extend the analysis to consider the estimation of
subjective probabilities, and finally to subjective beliefs.

A. Non-Linear Mixed Logit for Lottery Choices
Assume a sample of N subjects making choices over J lotteries in T experimental tasks.6 In
all of the applications we consider, J=2 since the subjects are making choices over two lotteries, but
there are many designs in which the subject is asked to make choices over J>2 lotteries (e.g.,
Binswanger [1981], Eckel and Grossman [2002]). In the traditional mixed logit literature one can
view the individual n as deriving utility ) from alternative j in task t, given by

)njt = $n xnjt + gnjt

(1)

where $n is a vector of coefficients specific to subject n, xnjt is a vector of observed attributes of
individual n and/or alternative j in task t, and gnjt is a random term that is assumed to be an
identically and independently distributed extreme value. We use the symbol ) for utility in (1), since
we will need to generalize to allow for non-linear utility functions, and expected utility functionals,
and prefer to think of (1) as defining a general, latent index rather than as specifically utility. In our
experience, this purely semantic difference avoids some confusions about interpretation. Each $n is
6

It is trivial to allow J and T to vary with the individual, but for ease of notation we omit that generality.
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traditionally estimated as a distribution based on 2 or more hyper-parameters. In the case of a
normal distribution they would be the mean and standard deviation of the population distribution.
Specifically, for our purposes we need to extend (1) to allow for non-linear functions H
defined over $ and the values of x, such as

)njt = H($n, xnjt) + gnjt

(2)

For example, x might consist of the vector of monetary prizes mk and probabilities pk, for outcome
k of K in a given lottery, and we might assume an Expo-Power (EP) utility function originally
proposed by Saha [1993]. Following Holt and Laury [2002], the EP function is defined as
U(mk) = [1-exp(-" mk 1-D)]/",

(3)

where " and D are parameters to be jointly estimated. The EP function can exhibit increasing or
decreasing relative risk aversion (RRA), depending on the parameter ": RRA is defined by D + "(1-

D)mk1-D, so RRA varies with income if " … 0 and the estimate of D defines RRA at a zero income.
This function nests CRRA (as " 6 0) and CARA (as D 6 0). Under expected utility theory (EUT)
the probabilities for each outcome are those that are induced by the experimenter.7 Hence expected
utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery j:
EUj = 'k [ pk × U(mk) ]

(4)

If we let $ = {", D} here, so that we would estimate the hyper-parameters of the distribution over "
and D, our two risk preferences, we will want to let H($n, xnjt) be defined by H("n, Dn, mnjt, pnjt) using
(3) and (4). It is then possible to evaluate the latent index ) in (2).8
7
This approach generalizes immediately to non-EUT models in which there are more parameters, say to
account for probability weighting and loss aversion. It also generalizes to non-CRRA specifications within EUT models
that allow for more flexible specifications of risk attitudes that might vary with the level of the prizes.
8
The extension from a linear mixed logit specification, assuming (1), to a non-linear mixed logit specification,
assuming (2), has an attractive side-benefit when it comes to identifying the effects of demographic variables such as sex.
In the usual specification with linear latent indices of utility the effects of attribute-invariant effects drop out, and one
can only consider them by considering interactions with attributes. In effect, the non-linearity of (2) builds this
interaction in at a structural theoretical level. The intuition derives from the fact that only differences in (expected) utility
matter for choice. Thus one can re-normalize (expected) utility more or less at will, with minor mathematical constraints,
as long as the (expected) utility numbers have the same ordering. Then, as Train [2003; p.25] notes: “The same issue
affects the way that socio-demographic variables enter a model. Attributes of the alternatives, such as the time and cost
of travel on different modes, generally vary over alternatives. However, attributes of the decision maker do not vary over
alternatives. They can only enter the model if they are specified in ways that create differences in utility over alternatives.”
If the sex of the agent affects the risk attitude, then this characteristics will affect the (expected) utility evaluation of a
given lottery, since each lottery will typically have attributes given by probabilities and outcomes that vary across the two
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The population density for $ is denoted f ($|2), where 2 is a vector defining what we refer
to as the hyper-parameters of the distribution of $. Thus individual realizations of $, such as $n, are
distributed according to some density function f. For example, if f is a Normal density then 21
would be the mean of that density and 22 the standard deviation of that density, and we would
estimate the hyper-parameters 21 and 22. Or f could be a Uniform density and 21 would be the lower
bound and 22 would be the upper bound. If $ consisted of more than two parameters, as it does in
the case of an EP utility function (3), then 2 might also include terms representing the covariance of
those parameters.
Conditional on $n, the probability that the subject n chooses alternative i in task t is then
given by the conditional logit formula, modestly extended to allow our non-linear index
Lnit($n) = exp{H($n, xnit)} / 'j exp{H($n, xnjt)}

(5)

The probability of the observed choices by subject n, over all tasks T, again conditional on knowing

$n, is given by

Pn($n) = (t Ln i(n,t)t ($n)

(6)

where i(n,t) denotes the lottery chosen by subject n in task t, following the notation of Revelt and
Train [1998]. The unconditional probability involves integrating over the distribution of $:
Pn(2) = I Pn($n) f ($|2) d $

(7)

and is therefore the weighted average of a product of logit formulas evaluated at different values of

$, with the weights given by the density f.
We can then define the log-likelihood by

LL(2) = 'n ln Pn(2)

(8)

and approximate it numerically using simulation methods, since it cannot be solved analytically.
Using the methods of Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) reviewed in Train [2003; §6.6, ch.10]

alternatives presented to the subject in any given choice. In effect, the non-linear specification (2) naturally builds in the
effect that characteristics have on utility differences. Andersen, Harrison, Hole and Rutström [2010] provide a more
formal statement of this result.
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and Cameron and Trivedi [2005; ch.12], we define the simulated log-likelihood by taking r=1,R
replications $r from the density f ($|2):

SLL(2) = 'n ln 6 'r Pn($r)/R >

(9)

The core insight of MSL is to evaluate the likelihood conditional on a randomly drawn $r, do that R
times, and then simply take the unweighted average over all R likelihoods so evaluated. The average
is unweighted since each replication r is equally likely, by design. If R is “large enough,” then MSL
converges, under modest assumptions, to the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator.9
It is a simple matter to extend this approach to include non-random coefficients as well. In
this case the hyper-parameter of the coefficient consists of just one scalar. To use the earlier
example, if f is assumed to be a Normal density then 21 would be the mean of that density and 22
the standard deviation of that density, and we would estimate 21 and simply constrain 22=0.

B. Estimating a Subjective Probability
Having demonstrated the method of MSL based on estimating risk preference parameters,
we continue with a discussion of the parameters of core interest to us, the subjective beliefs. We
start by assuming away uncertainty and discuss the estimation of subjective probabilities.
Assume that there are two outcomes, A and B, that exhaust the set of outcomes. In our case
A would be an orange ball being selected from our experimental bingo cage, and B would be a white
ball being selected. The subject that selects event or outcome A from a given bookie b receives EU
EUA =

BA × U(payout if A occurs | bet on A) +
(1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on A)

(10)

where BA is the subjective probability that A will occur. The payouts that enter the utility function
are defined by the odds that each bookie offers, and are set by the experimenter. We discuss them in

9
An important practical consideration with MSL is the manner in which replicates are drawn, and the size of R
that is practically needed. We employ Halton draws to provide better coverage of the density than typical uniform
number generators: see Train [2003; ch.9] for an exposition, and Drukker and Gates [2006] for the numerical
implementation we employ. Our computational implementation generalizes the linear mixed logit program developed for
Stata by Hole [2007], and is documented in Andersen, Harrison, Hole and Rutström [2010].
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the next section, but for now assume that they vary from bookie to bookie. For the bet offered by a
bookie offering 10:1 odds on event A, for example, and assuming no “house take” by the bookie,
these payouts are $10 and $0 for every 1$ that is bet, so we have
EUA = BA × U($10) + (1-BA) × U($0)

(10N)

We similarly define the EU received from a bet on event B as:
EUB =

BA × U(payout if A occurs | bet on B) +
(1-BA) × U(payout if B occurs | bet on B).

(11)

and this translates for the first bookie, offering 10:1 odds on A and (10/9):1 odds on B, into payouts
of $0 and $1.11, so we have
EUB = BA × U($0) + (1-BA) × U($1.11)

(11N)

for this particular bookie and bet. We observe the bet made by the subject, so we can calculate the
likelihood of that choice given values of D, " and BA.
We need D and " to evaluate the utility function in (10) and (11), and we need BA to calculate
the EU in (10) and (11) once we know the utility values, and hence the latent indices (5) that
generate the likelihood of observing the choice of event A or event B. The joint maximum likelihood
problem is to find the values of these parameters that best explain observed choices in the belief
elicitation tasks as well as observed choices in the lottery tasks. In effect, the lottery task allow us to
identify D and " under EUT, since BA plays no direct role in explaining the choices in that task.10
In practical terms the only difference between the likelihood contribution from the lottery
tasks and the betting tasks is how the probability of the outcome enters each problem. For the
lottery tasks this is given as data, and for the betting tasks this is estimated as a parameter. Either
way, once the EU is defined, the likelihood of the observed choices are evaluated identically.

10
The value of joint estimation, particularly when paired with an experimental design with multiple tasks to
help identification, is discussed in more general terms in Harrison and Rutström [2008], Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2008], and Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2010].
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C. Estimating a Subjective Belief
The extension to estimate a subjective belief is immediate, and involves setting $ = (", D, BA)
and treating the risk aversion coefficients " and D as non-random while the subjective belief BA is
treated as a random coefficient. We eventually treat both as random coefficients, but prefer to focus
attention here on the subjective belief alone.
There are two possible interpretations of the estimates obtained when one allows the
subjective probability to be estimated as a random coefficient. These interpretations are fundamental
to the validity of our approach.
One interpretation is that each subject picks one specific subjective probability value from that
distribution when they place their bets: it is as if they draw a specific subjective probability from the
population distribution “urn” and then use that probability draw to place their bets. In effect, one
subject sees the turning bingo cage and thinks he sees 15% orange balls, another subject sees the
same cage and thinks he sees 20%, and another subject sees the same cage and thinks he sees 25%;
in each case the subjects can be viewed as making draws from a single population distribution. Each
subject then acts as if there is no uncertainty around those individual perceptions when making their
bets. This interpretation is exactly the one that the traditional econometric literature makes when
estimating random coefficients, adapted for our task of estimating subjective beliefs. From a
behavioral viewpoint, at the time of placing the bet there is no uncertainty from the perspective of
the subject.
Another interpretation is that our subjects each carry around with them a personal subjective
(posterior) probability distribution after they see the spinning bingo cage, and access that
distribution when making their bets. This distribution can be assumed to be a replica of the
population distribution. Under this interpretation the estimated population distribution is in fact the
distribution used by each subject. Behaviorally, each subject is viewed as facing uncertainty when
placing the bet.
If we adopt the first interpretation, then the belief BA that we recover is actually consistent
-9-

with many supporting belief distributions at the level of the individual, and is the mean of those
distributions. To see this well-known result, initially assume that we elicit the belief BA=0.65, and
that the subject has a degenerate belief distribution with all mass at that point. Under EUT the
subject has the EU for a bet on A occurring given by (10), and the EU for a bet on B occurring
given by (11). Now assume that the subject actually had a 2-point distribution with density f(BA1)=½
at 0.60 and f(BA2)=½ at 0.70. Define EUA1 by substituting BA1 for BA in (10), define EUA2 by substituting

BA2 for BA in (10), and similarly define EU1B and EU2B by corresponding substitutions in (11). Then the
EU for a bet on A is now the compound lottery
EUA = [ f(BA1) × EUA1 ] + [ f(BA2) × EUA2 ]

(12)

and the EU for a bet on B is similarly defined. Since the outcomes in the conditional lotteries are the
same, one can collect terms and see that (12) is identical to

:(BA)×U(payout if A occurs | bet on A) + (1-:(BA))×U(payout if B occurs | bet on A)

(13)

where :(BA) / [ f(BA1) × BA1 ] + [ f(BA2) × BA2 ], the mean of the 2-point distribution. Thus the choice
behavior of an individual with a 2-point probability distribution is identical to the choice behavior of
an individual with a 1-point probability distribution where that one point is given by the mean of the
2-point distribution for that individual. This does not mean that the individual has a 1-point
distribution, just that we cannot use his choice behavior to say whether he has a 1-point or 2-point
distribution.
Thus we can only claim, at least under EUT, that we elicit the mean belief for an individual.
We cannot identify the underlying distribution of beliefs for an individual based solely on the choice of
that individual, nor can we rule out the possibility that the individual has a non-degenerate probability
distribution. It is immediate that this result generalizes to asymmetric distributions with more than 2
mass points, and indeed to continuous distributions. The same result generalizes to RDU11 if one

11

Of course, in the case of RDU it is the average weighted probability that is elicited, and an additional step is
needed to recover the subjective probability itself.
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maintains the Reduction of Compound Lottery axiom, as is common.12
The upshot is that one has to look to choices across individuals to be able to identify the
underlying distribution of beliefs. Ideally this would involve different individuals making comparable
choices in response to the same physical stimuli, and where there is no reason to expect different
individuals to have different priors about the true outcome. This is exactly the domain in which
controlled laboratory experiments can play a critical role, and the design we propose implements this
ideal environment.

D. Bounded Beliefs
One essential characteristic of beliefs, if they are to have the interpretation of uncertain
probabilities, is that the distribution have a domain that is bounded on the unit interval.13
Unfortunately, Normal distributions do not have this property: even if the mean is constrained to be
in the unit interval (e.g., using some common non-linear transformation), there is no easy way to
constrain the standard deviation to ensure this property. Of course, one might be “lucky” and
generate estimates that are practically bounded in the unit interval in terms of non-negligible
densities, but in general one wants a more elegant solution to this problem.
One attractive option is to employ a transformation of the Normal distribution known as the
Logit-Normal (L-N) distribution. Originally proposed by Aitchison and Begg [1976; p.3] as an
excellent, tractable approximation to the Beta distribution, it has been resurrected by Lasaffre,
Rizopoulos and Tsonaka [2007]. One nice property of the L-N distribution is that MSL algorithms
developed for univariate or multivariate Normal distributions can be applied directly, providing one
allows non-linear transformations of the structural parameters, which is exactly what we need to do
12

The axiom of EUT that is typically relaxed is the Independence Axiom, and the Reduction of Compound
Lotteries axiom is almost always retained (e.g., Quiggin [1993; p. 19, 134, 154]). It also has considerable normative appeal
in a-temporal settings, such as we have in mind here. However, Segal [1987][1990] illustrates some implications of
relaxing the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom for RDU. To reiterate, we are focusing solely on probabilistically
sophisticated versions of RDU in which the subjective belief can be recovered.
13
Smith [1969] provides a particularly eloquent explanation of this elementary point, which was initially
forgotten in the debates over how to account for the Ellsberg paradox. Of course, subjective probabilities are not the
same as decision weights and “Choquet capacities,” which were applied to this problem well after Smith [1969].
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anyway to model subjective beliefs as bounded in the unit interval.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the wide array of distributional forms that are accommodated by
the L-N distribution. The bi-modal distributions in the top right of Figure 1 and top left of Figure 2
are particularly attractive, since they reflect the maintained assumptions of several of the most
tractable models of uncertainty aversion.
In the context of the betting task in our experiment, where there is uncertainty about the mix
of orange and white balls in a bingo cage, the continuous distributions of Figures 1 and 2 might be
used to approximate different discrete subjective belief distributions over the subjective probability

BA on the event A of an orange ball being drawn. The earlier discussion in §C provided an example
of 1 and 2 point belief distributions over the subjective probability BA, but one can imagine other
belief distributions with positive probability support for any of the discrete points in the range of
possible proportions of orange balls in the bingo cage. The distributions in Figure 1 can be used to
approximate discrete belief distributions that reflect a symmetry in beliefs about which color is likely,
while the distributions in Figure 2 can be used to approximate belief distributions expressing
uncertainty over all possible subjective probabilities BA, but where the chances of a ball being one
color can be favored. L-N distributions can also be used to approximate extreme 2-point
distributions about the proportion of orange balls in the cage, such as that there are either all orange
or all white balls in the bingo cage.
Similarly, more extreme versions of the distributions illustrated in Figure 2 capture the
“pessimism in priors” of the “maximin” characterization of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]. And the
top right panel of Figure 1 captures the characterization of Ghirardoto, Maccheroni and Marinacci
[2004] in which there is some weight on the most pessimistic prior and the most optimistic prior.
The interim cases in Figures 1 and 2 allow one to capture more general characterizations, such as
proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005].14

14

The expression “prior” in these models refers to one specific subjective probability for an event BA from a
set of such subjective probabilities for an event (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989; p.142-3].
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We stress the flexibility of the L-N family because provides an attractive specification for
efforts to estimate general models of attitudes towards uncertainty.

E. A Final Extension
One final extension is to allow for a “behavioral noise” term to affect choices. We adopt the
contextual utility specification advocated by Wilcox [2008][2010] for this purpose, which adds one
additional non-random coefficient : to estimate. When the constraint :=1 is imposed there is no
behavioral noise term in the specification.

2. Experimental Design and Sample
We recruited 97 subjects from the student population of the University of Central Florida in
late October 2008 to participate in these experiments.
Figure 3 illustrates the lottery choice that subjects were given. Each subject faced 45 such
choices, where prizes spanned the domain $0 up to $100. One choice was selected to be paid out at
random after all choices had been entered. Choices of indifference were resolved by flipping a coin
and picking one lottery, as had been explained to subject. This interface builds on the classic design
of Hey and Orme [1994], and is discussed in greater detail in Harrison and Rutström [2008;
Appendix B].
Figure 4 shows the betting interface presented to subjects, which was shown to subjects on a
computer screen and in hand instructions. Prior to this interface, the subjects had been introduced
to naturally occurring instances of this type of betting interface, on events ranging from the United
States Presidential Election, the winner of the American Idol television program, and outcomes of the
NBA basketball season. The interface in Figure 4 was then explained with these instructions:
First, for each betting task we will provide you with odds from 9 betting
houses. Think of these as just 9 different physical or online locations where you can
make your bet, each offering different odds. You need to decide what bet to place
for each betting house. You do not need to make the same bet for each betting
house.
-13-

Second, in this hypothetical example we are giving you a $100 stake to bet
with for each betting house in each of the betting tasks you will be presented with.
The rules here are that you only get to place one bet in each betting house, and your
stake for one house cannot be applied to another betting house. In the actual tasks
today we will not be having stakes as high as $100, but the stakes we provide are real.
Third, after you have placed your bets on all 9 betting houses, we will
randomly choose one of the 9 betting houses to determine your actual payment.
After you have finished placing all of your bets, we will come over and let you roll a
die to decide which betting house we will actually use. So you are placing 9 bets in all,
will play out one of them, picked at random, and you could win or lose on that bet.
The subjects were then taken through a worked example in which they were told how many orange
and white balls were in the cage, and shown how to place bets. They were then taken through each
possible outcome. The concept of “house probabilities” was also explained, as follows:
Beside each set of house odds, we also display the house probability that
each event will occur. This is just another way of thinking about the odds offered by
each betting house. Some people understand house odds better, and some people
understand house probabilities better.
The house probabilities are just the inverse of the odds. So if the odds for a
particular betting house say that you will be paid $5 for every $1 bet if the ball is
Orange, as in betting House 2, then this implies a house probability for the Orange
ball of $1 ÷ $5 = 0.2. This is the same thing as saying that betting House 2 believes
there is a 20% chance of the ball being Orange. We have rounded some of the
probabilities to make the screen easier to read, and you will be paid according to the
odds.
The house probabilities might help you work out what is the best bet for
you. For example, if you personally think the probability of an Orange outcome is
lower than the house probability offered by a betting house, you might be inclined to
bet against Orange with that house. (You bet “against” Orange by betting “for”
White, of course). But if your personal probability of an Orange outcome is higher
than the house probability offered by a betting house, you might be inclined to bet
on Orange with that house. It is just as if you were placing a bet with a friend,
because you disagree on the chances of something happening.
All subjects were able to place a series of bets in this practice round before the actual bets for real
payment.
The actual betting tasks involved more draws from bingo cages with ping-pong balls. They
were explained as follows:
We will now repeat the task with Ping Pong balls a few times.
We have a number of ping pong balls in each of three bingo cages, which we
have labeled Cage A, Cage B and Cage C. Some of the ping pong balls are Orange
-14-

and some are White. We will roll each bingo cage and you can decide for yourself
what fraction of Orange balls you think are in the cage. Of course, the balls will be
rolling around, and you may not be able to tell exactly how many Orange balls are in
the cage. You will be asked to bet on the color of one ping pong ball, selected at
random after you all place your bets. For example, if there are 20 Orange balls and
80 White balls, the chance of an Orange ball being picked at random is 20 ÷ 100, or
20%.
We will do this task 3 times, with 3 different bingo cages. Just be sure that
you check which cage you are placing a bet on. You can see this listed in the top left
corner of your screen, where it refers to Cage A, Cage B or Cage C. We will show
you each cage one at a time, and allow you to place your bets after we show it to you.
Figure 3 displays the sequence that was followed here. The cage was initially draped in an opaque
towel, bearing the Golden Knight logo of the University of Central Florida. The cage was placed atop a
tall table, so that all subjects had a clear view of it. A tall research assistant then took off the towel
and turned the cage for roughly 10 seconds, timed by another assistant. Then the cage was covered
again and subjects asked to place their bets. Once the bets for Cage A were completed, a similar
sequence was followed for Cages B and C. At that point we selected a ball from each of Cages A, B
and C. The final event for payment was decided at the end of the experimental session, and there
was a 3-in-7 chance that one of these cages would be selected for payment.15
The distribution of orange balls within each session spanned a “low,” “medium” and “high”
value, in random order across sessions. There were 6 physical stimuli used across all sessions. These
stimuli used 6, 12, 30, 33, 45 and 48 orange balls out of a total of 60, implying true objective
probabilities of 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.55, 0.75 and 0.8, respectively.
Our betting task provides a clean counterpart to the theoretical framework used for decades
to operationalize what is meant by subjective beliefs. Consider two recent examples from the
literature. Machina [2004; p.2] carefully defines two ways of representing uncertainty. One he calls
“objective uncertainty,” and involves known probabilities and choices over lotteries. The other he

15

Beliefs for completely unrelated events were elicited after the beliefs about the ping-pong ball draws. One
event was the outcome of scores on a psychology test of the relative “empathy” of men and women, and three events
related to the 2008 Presidential Election outcomes. Those events did not provide the control that the ping-pong ball
events had, in terms of every subject being provided with exactly the same physical signals. We note, as anecdote, that we
were astonished to see how excited the subjects were about the draws of ping-pong balls from these bingo cages. The
nightlife in Orlando is not that bad.
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calls “subjective uncertainty,” and is represented by mutually exclusive and exhaustive states of
nature, and where the objects of choice consist of bets or acts which yield outcomes that depend on
the realized state of nature. Similarly, Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005; p.1854] stress the
importance of modeling preferences over what they call “second order acts” which assign utilityrelevant consequences to the events that the subject is uncertain about. They
suggest that second order acts are not as strange or unfamiliar as they might first
appear. Consider any parametric setting, i.e., a finite dimensional parameter space
[such that the elements of this parameter space define the subjective belief]. Second
order acts would simply be bets on the value of the parameter. In a parametric
portfolio investment example, these could be bets about the parameter values that
characterize the asset returns, e.g., means, variances, and covariances. Similarly, in
model uncertainty applications, second order acts are bets about the values of the
relevant parameters in the underlying model. Closer to decision theory, for an
Ellsberg urn, second order acts may be viewed as bets on the composition of the
urn.
This is exactly the choice task our subjects faced when one considers the array of bookies, each with
different odds, they had to place bets with. The set of bet choices is based on the subject’s beliefs
about “the composition of the urn.”16
An additional feature of our design was that it allowed us to estimate the conventional risk
attitudes of the sample, as we were jointly estimating subjective beliefs. Because those beliefs can
only be identified in the context of some betting task of the kind we implemented,17 one has to
know risk attitudes in order to separate out the effects of subjective beliefs and preferences over
risk.

16

It is possible to design artefactual laboratory experiments that can do even more. Imagine an Ellsberg urn
with unknown mixtures of orange and white balls, but where the subject is told that there are only 10 balls. The urn is
presented, but with a thick towel draped over it. The subject is asked to place bets on each of the 11 possible mixtures:
they earn $1 if the mixture is in fact that one, $0 otherwise. Then simply remove the towel and have the composition of
the urn verified.
17
Virtually all other experimental procedures for evaluating choice under uncertainty, such as quadratic scoring
rules and auctions for eliciting certainty-equivalents, amount to bets in one form or another. So this point is not specific
to our design, of course.
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3. Results
We initially estimate the subjective probability that a representative agent would have for
each of the stimuli using maximum likelihood, and thereby assuming away any variance in the
population distribution. This will allow us to see the “value added” from having the richer
characterization provided by a random coefficients specification using maximum simulated
likelihood. We then consider the interim random coefficients case in which we constrain the
population mean to be equal to the objective probability for each stimulus, and only estimate the
population standard deviation.18 This allows us to see the pure effect of allowing for some
population standard deviation in the estimated distribution. We finally consider the random
coefficients case in which we estimate the mean and standard deviation of the population process for
each stimulus.19

A. Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Table 1 shows the estimated subjective probabilities obtained using maximum likelihood
methods and the assumption that there is no population standard deviation in subjective beliefs.
Underlying these estimates is evidence of a concave utility function, reflecting risk aversion for these
subjects. The estimates are familiar from the literature with student subjects of this type (see Holt
and Laury [2002] and Harrison and Rutström [2008]). The coefficient D is estimated to be 0.48 with
a 95% confidence interval of [0.44, 0.52], and the coefficient " is estimated to be 0.083 with a 95%
confidence interval of [0.06, 0.11]. So there is evidence of risk aversion at low levels of prizes, since

D>0, and there is evidence of increasing relative risk aversion as prizes increase up to $100, since
">0. The same qualitative pattern emerges with random coefficients estimates of these parameters,
reported in the next sections.

18

Even though we refer to estimating a mean and/or standard deviation, the resulting population is not
Gaussian, since we employ the Logistic-Normal distribution.
19
Detailed estimation results, and all software and data to replicate our results using Stata, are available on
request.
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Turning to the estimates of the subjective probabilities, we find that there are some
significant deviations in subjective probabilities from objective probabilities for the case in which
there are 6 or 12 orange balls out of 60. However, for all other cases the estimated subjective
probabilities are relatively close to the objective probability. In the case of 6 orange balls, our
estimates “collapse” to suggest that subjects behaved as if there were none. In the case of 12 orange
balls, our estimates suggest that the subjective probability is significantly greater than the objective
probability.
These estimates reflect a further assumption that there is a single representative agent whose
subjective probability we are estimating. It is a simple matter to extend this analysis to allow the core
structural parameters to reflect observable covariates.20 Thus we could estimate the subjective
probability that women hold when we have 6 orange balls and contrast it to the subjective
probability that men hold. Even if the same bets were placed by men and women in this case, any
differences in their estimated utility functions could lead to differences in inferred subjective
probabilities.
To illustrate, consider the 12-ball case. If we allow for the effects of sex and having a selfreported GPA greater than 3.75. The marginal effect on inferred subjective probabilities if for
women to have a higher probability of 5.4 percentage points (95% confidence interval of [0.8, 10]
percentage points) and those with a high GPA to have a higher probability of 0.1 percentage points
(95% confidence interval of [-4.9, 5.1] percentage points). Since a male that does not have a high
GPA has an estimated subjective probability of 0.36 (95% confidence interval of [0.33, 0.40]), we
can infer four subjective probabilities:
•
•
•
•

women with a high GPA have a subjective probability of 0.420;
women without a high GPA have a subjective probability of 0.4219;
men a high GPA have a subjective probability of 0.366; and
men without a high GPA have a subjective probability of 0.365.

One could obviously extend this analysis to consider more covariates, and more interactions of
20

All standard errors are corrected for “clustering” at the level of the individual, which captures heterogeneity
to some extent.
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covariates, as in Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2010].
It is worth noting that women have a significantly higher estimate of D, and those with a
high GPA have a significantly higher estimate of ". These differences in utility functions need to be
taken into account when inferring subjective probabilities. That is, one might see the same pattern of
bookie choices for men and women, but if they have different utility functions one would draw
different inferences about their implied subjective probabilities. The same principle of inference
holds with the random coefficients specifications.

B. Random Coefficients Estimates, with the Mean Constrained to Equal the True Mean
Figure 6 collects results assuming that the average subjective belief is equal to the true
probability of the urn, but that allows for there to be some subjective uncertainty around that
average. This assumption maintains some degree of rational expectations, in the sense that there is
some “wisdom of crowds” with respect to the average belief. It also illustrates our approach in stark
form, since all that we estimate here is the population standard deviation in beliefs. All estimates
were obtained using maximum simulated likelihood methods, using 100 Halton draws.
We find a familiar pattern of risk aversion, with modest levels of RRA for small prize levels
and increasing RRA for higher prize levels, using the Expo-Power utility function (3). The estimate
of 1-D is distributed as N(0.551, 0.180), with the estimate of the population mean and population
standard deviation each being statistically significantly greater than zero. Hence we reject the
hypothesis that all subjects have the same risk attitude parameter D, consistent with the conventional
view that risk preferences are heterogeneous across subjects. There is not so much heterogeneity in
the parameter ", which is distributed as N(0.022, 0.004), and where the estimate of the population
standard deviation is not statistically different from zero. But the point estimate of the population
mean of " is positive, and statistically significant, implying that RRA increases by 0.22 (= 0.022 ×
100, since the highest prize was $100) over the prize domain [$0, $100]. Joint estimation of these risk

-19-

aversion parameters and the subjective belief distributions takes this increasing RRA into account.21
The estimates in Figure 6 are derived from 10,000 simulations of the L-N distribution
parameter estimates. To illustrate, consider the case of 30 orange balls first. Here the L-N
distribution is 7(N(0, 0.11)). The Normal distribution inside this composite function has a mean of
0 and standard deviation of 0.11, and each of those point estimates has a standard error (indicating,
incidentally, that each point estimate is significantly greater than 0). So one would take 10,000 draws
from a normal distribution centered around 0 with that standard deviation, and then transform each
such draw with the logistic transform. Since the logistic transforms values of 0 to be 0.5, it is not
surprising that this distribution is centered in Figure 6 at 0.5. The L-N distribution has a standard
deviation of 0.028.
Now consider the case of 33 balls, where the L-N distribution is 7(N(-0.2, 0.18)). The
Normal distribution inside this composite function has a lower mean than the 30-ball distribution,
and a larger standard deviation. The logistic transforms negative values to be greater than 0.5, hence
we see the L-N distribution for the 33-ball case to be centered around 0.55 with a standard deviation
of 0.044. Thus it is the same as the 30-ball distribution apart from being shifted to the right and with
a slightly larger standard deviation. Although the transformations are more extreme, of course, a
similar logic explains the shape of the other L-N distributions in Figure 6 given the core parameter
estimates.
Turning to the substance of the estimates, we see predictable symmetry for the stimuli
centered near 0.5, and skewness for the stimuli closer to 0 or 1. Given the lack of skewness for the
middle stimuli and the skewness for the extreme stimuli, the modes are either right on the objective
probabilities or to one side of them. There is more uncertainty about the extreme stimuli, not
surprisingly.
The distributions shown in Figure 6 could also be conditioned on observable covariates,

21

In other words, when bets with bookies offering one or two “low” stakes are evaluated, a smaller RRA is
used than when evaluating bookies offering one or more higher stakes.
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such as sex and GPA level. In this case the underlying coefficients would be linear functions of these
covariates, so one would generate four distinct population distributions rather than just one for a
given stimulus.

C. Unconstrained Random Coefficients Estimates
Figure 7 takes one more step in the estimation compared to Figure 6, and allows the mean of
the population distribution to be unconstrained. The differences are striking.
For the 30-ball case we see an almost degenerate L-N distribution, with a mean of 0.54 and a
standard deviation of 0.003, much smaller than the standard deviation for the corresponding
distribution in Figure 6 where the mean was constrained to be 0.5. For the 33-ball case we see
virtually the same estimates as in the constrained case. Thus, shifting the physical stimuli from
exactly 0.5 to 0.55 added some degree of uncertainty to the subjective belief distribution.
For the 45-ball and 48-ball cases we infer virtually the same subjective probability
distributions as in Figure 6. But for the 6-ball and 12-ball cases we get very different results. In each
case the mode and mean of the subjective distribution are significantly greater than the objective
probability. This contrasts with the distributions for the 45-ball and 48-ball cases. Now the 45-ball
case corresponds to an objective probability of 0.75, and is therefore not directly symmetric to the
12-ball (0.2) or 6-ball (0.10) cases, but the 48-ball and 12-ball cases are exactly symmetric. Thus one
might have expected to see “mirror image” subjective belief distributions in these two cases, and we
do not.22

4. Conclusions
In some sense, our approach to estimating subjectively uncertain beliefs is “too simple.”
That simplicity derives from some strong assumptions, which we want to be clear about. We are not

22

Ireland.

Nor did we have a subject pool dominated by Dutch football fans or pro-British Protestants from Northern
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particularly concerned here about the specific parametric forms assumed, since they can be relaxed
easily enough.23 Nor does the artefactual exploitation of simple “bingo cage” stimuli, in which we
know the true population process, concern us immediately, since if we cannot handle this controlled
domain of inference then we have no business wandering blind into the field of natural processes.
There are some deeper conceptual assumptions.
We assume that the subject evaluates lotteries defined over a stochastic process that has
uncertain probabilities with the same risk attitudes that are used to evaluate lotteries defined over a
stochastic process that has certain probabilities. In effect, we assume that aversion to uncertainty24 is
the same as aversion to risk. Starting with Ellsberg [1961], the validity of this assumption has been
questioned. Working within an EUT framework, or very close to it, Ergin and Gul [2009],
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005], Nau [2006][2007] and Neilsen [2008] offer representations
of preferences over uncertain and risk choices that differentiate uncertainty aversion and risk
aversion.25 Each representation collapses to the one we employ as a special case in which the two
types of aversion are assumed to be the same, so in an important formal sense they each provide
“smooth” characterizations of uncertainty aversion that differentiate it from risk aversion. Our
approach provides the basis for estimating representations of this type.
Our results do show that beliefs for simple, physical stimuli do not appear to be statistically
degenerate probability distributions. Identifying the theoretical structure of that non-degeneracy
remains an open area of research.

23

For example, it is a simple matter to more flexible specifications that allow for the experimental prizes to be
integrated with some baseline income level (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008]). Or non-EUT
specifications that allow for probability weighting and/or loss aversion (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; p.85ff.]). Our
objective is not to find the best parametric specification for these data.
24
The literature uses different terminology for concepts that are very similar, if not identical. The expression
“uncertainty aversion” is used in Nau [2006], and is closely related to the concept of “ambiguity aversion” in Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji [2005], the concept of “second-order risk aversion” in Ergin and Gul [2009], and even the
concept of “information aversion” in Grant, Kajii and Polak [1998].
25
Non-EUT characterizations are also popular: see Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], Ghirardoto, Maccheroni and
Marinacci [2004] and Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler [2008].
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Figure 1: Illustrative Symmetric Logit-Normal Distributions
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Figure 2: Illustrative Asymmetric Logit-Normal Distributions
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Figure 3: Illustrative Lottery Choice

Figure 4: Illustrative Betting Choices
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Figure 5: The Event
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Table 1: Estimated Subjective Probabilities
There are 60 balls in all. So when there are 6, 12, 30, 33, 45 and 48 orange balls,
the true probability is 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.55, 0.75 and 0.8, respectively.
Parameter

B6
B12
B30
B33
B45
B48

Definition

Point Estimate Standard Error

Subjective probability when 6 balls
Subjective probability when 12 balls
Subjective probability when 30 balls
Subjective probability when 33 balls
Subjective probability when 45 balls
Subjective probability when 48 balls

0.001
0.369
0.556
0.548
0.710
0.718

0.014
0.017
0.012
0.007
0.044
0.025

95% Confidence
0.000‡
0.335
0.533
0.534
0.624
0.668

0.029
0.403
0.579
0.562
0.795
0.767

Note: ‡ These estimates are calculated using the delta method, and approximation error with a point
estimate so close to the lower boundary of 0 results in this lower bound being calculated to
be negative (-0.028). This value of 0 is imposed a priori.
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Figure 6: Estimated Belief Distributions
With Means Constrained to True Probabilities
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Figure 7: Estimated Belief Distributions
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